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Abstract. The paper treats 4 different fragments of first-order logic in-
duced by their respective versions of Kripke style semantics for modal intu-
itionistic logic. In order to capture these fragments, the notion of asimula-
tion, defined in [7], is modified and extended to yield Van Benthem type of
semantic characterization of their respective expressive powers. It is shown
further, that this characterization can be easily carried over to arbitrary
first-order definable subclasses of classical first-order models.
Keywords. model theory, modal logic, intuitionistic logic, propositional
logic, bisimulation, Van Benthem’s theorem.
It was shown in [7] and [8] that both intuitionistic first-order logic and its propo-
sitional fragment, viewed as a different fragments of classical first-order logic, admit
of a full analogue of modal characterization theorem1 where invariance with respect
to bisimulations is replaced with invariance with respect to (first-order) asimulations
respectively. The present paper extends these results onto the main versions of basic
modal intuitionistic logic.
The layout of the paper is as follows. Section 1 starts with notational conventions,
after which we introduce the main variants of Kripke style semantics for the basic
modal intuitionistic system. All in all we consider 4 different variants of semantics, of
which 2 are easily discharged by the versions of clauses employed in [7] and [8] for basic
intutionistic logic. However, for the other 2 systems their semantical characterization
is less obvious, mainly due to their treatment of diamond modality.
Section 2 then starts with the main task of the present paper. It contains defini-
tions for all the four variants of extension of basic asimulation notion to be employed
in semantic characterization of their respective variants of basic modal intuitionistic
logic. We also formulate here the main results of the paper, although their proofs are
postponed till Sections 3 and 4. Then Section 5 is devoted to characterization of modal
intuitionistic fragments of FOL modulo first-order definable classes of models. Section
6 gives conclusions and drafts directions for future work.
1See, e.g. [2, Ch.1, Th. 13].
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1 Preliminaries
1.1 Notation
A formula is a formula of classical predicate logic without identity whose predicate let-
ters are in vocabulary Σ = {R2, R2
✷
, R2
✸
, P 11 , . . . P
1
n , . . . }. We assume {⊥,→,∨,∧, ∀, ∃ }
as the set of basic connectives and quantifiers for this variant of classical first-order lan-
guage, which we call correspondence language. A model is a classical first-order model of
correspondence language. We refer to correspondence formulas with lower-case Greek
letters ϕ, ψ, and χ, and to sets of correspondence formulas with upper-case Greek let-
ters Γ and ∆. If ϕ is a correspondence formula, then we associate with it the following
finite vocabulary Σϕ ⊆ Σ such that Σϕ = {R
2, R2
✷
, R2
✸
}∪{Pi | Pi occurs in ϕ }. More
generally, we refer with Θ to an arbitrary subset of Σ such that R ∈ Θ. If ψ is a
formula and every predicate letter occurring in ψ is in Θ, then we call ψ a Θ-formula.
We refer to sequence x1, . . . , xn of any objects as x¯n. We identify a sequence
consisting of a single element with this element. If all free variables of a formula ϕ
(formulas in Γ) coincide with a variable x, we write ϕ(x) (Γ(x)).
By degree of a classical first-order formula we mean the greatest number of nested
quantifiers occurring in it. Degree of a formula ϕ is denoted by r(ϕ). Its formal
definition by induction on the complexity of ϕ goes as follows:
r(⊥) = r(ϕ) = 0 for atomic ϕ
r(ϕ ◦ ψ) = max(r(ϕ), r(ψ)) for ◦ ∈ {∧,∨,→}
r(Qxϕ) = r(ϕ) + 1 for Q ∈ { ∀, ∃ }
For k ∈ N, we say that Θ-formula ϕ(x) such that r(ϕ) ≤ k is a (Θ, x, k)-formula.
For a binary relation S and any objects s, t we abbreviate the fact that s S t∧ t S s
by s
↔
S t.
We use the following notation for models of classical predicate logic:
M = 〈U, ι〉,M1 = 〈U1, ι1〉,M2 = 〈U2, ι2〉, . . . ,M
′ = 〈U ′, ι′〉,M ′′ = 〈U ′′, ι′′〉, . . . ,
where the first element of a model is its domain and the second element is its interpre-
tation of predicate letters. If k ∈ N then we write Rk (R✷k, R✸k) as an abbreviation for
ιk(R) (ιk(R✷) , ιk(R✸)). If a ∈ U then we say that (M,a) is a pointed model. Further,
we say that ϕ(x) is true at (M,a) and writeM,a |= ϕ(x) iff for any variable assignment
α in M such that α(x) = a we have M,α |= ϕ(x). It follows from this convention that
the truth of a formula ϕ(x) at a pointed model is to some extent independent from the
choice of its only free variable. Moreover, for k ∈ N we will sometimes write a |=k ϕ(x)
instead of Mk, a |= ϕ(x).
A modal intuitionistic formula is a formula of modal intuitionistic propositional
logic, where {⊥,→,∨,∧,✷,✸ } is the set of basic connectives and modal operators,
and { pn | n ∈ N } is the set of propositional letters. We refer to intuitionistic formulas
with letters I, J,K, possibly with primes or subscripts.
1.2 Definitions of basic modal intuitionistic logic
There exist different versions of basic system of modal intuitionistic logic. In these
paper we only consider versions that have a Kripke-style semantics associated with
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them, and we will view these versions via the lens of their respective Kripke-style
semantics.
Quite naturally, Kripke-style semantics for a given version of intuitionistic modal
logic is normally built as an extension of Kripke semantics for basic intuitionistic propo-
sitional logic; that is to say, the models extend Kripke models for basic propositional
logic and the satisfaction clauses for ⊥, →, ∨, ∧ are left unchanged (cf. [6, Definition
7.1 and Definition 7.2])
The new components in the models are one or more additional binary relations
between states which are needed to handle the satisfaction clauses for ✷ and ✸. In the
most general case both modal operators are handled by separate relations R✷ and R✸,
although not infrequently one assumes that R✷ and R✸ do coincide
2 or are otherwise
non-trivially related. It is also quite common to assume different conditions connecting
R✷ and R✸ with accessibility relation R, like, e. g. assuming that
R ◦R✷ ⊆ R✷ ◦R.
Both the condition that R✷ = R✸ and the other conditions mentioned in this
connection in the existing literature are easily first-order definable. Since it was shown
in [7] and [8] that asimulations are easily scalable according to arbitrary first-order
conditions imposed upon the models, we will first concentrate on the minimal case
without any restrictions imposed and then accommodate for the possible restrictions
in a trivial way, by restricting the domain and the counter-domain of asimulation
relations accordingly.
As for the satisfaction clauses, employed in the existing literature on Kripke-style
semantics for intuitionistic modal operators, the following variants of them seem to be
the most common and general:3
M, s |= ✷I ⇔ ∀t(sR✷t⇒M, t |= I) (✷1)
M, s |= ✷I ⇔ ∀t(sRt⇒ ∀u(tR✷u⇒M,u |= I)) (✷2)
M, s |= ✸I ⇔ ∃t(sR✸t ∧M, t |= I) (✸1)
M, s |= ✸I ⇔ ∀t(sRt⇒ ∀u(tR✸u ∧M,u |= I)) (✸2)
This gives us 4 possible choices of satisfaction clauses. In literature, these sets of
satisfaction clauses are often viewed as more or less explicit manifestations of one and
the same set of semantic intuitions. In this view, the reason why clauses (✷2) and
(✸2) differ from (✷1) and (✸1), respectively, is that the former clauses lift up to the
level of semantical definitions some desirable properties that under (✷1) and (✸1) are
handled by restrictions on the class of models.4 However, in what follows, we will
disregard this circumstance and will simply consider these four systems of clauses as
bona fide different systems. The reason for this is that, like we said above, we find it
convenient in the context of treating modal intuitionistic formulas via asimulations, to
omit whatever restrictions on models that are employed to equate these systems in the
existing literature on the subject.
Every of the 4 semantical choices sketched above induces a different standard trans-
lation of modal intuitionistic formulas into classical FOL thus giving a different frag-
2This is the case, e.g., for all the systems mentioned in [9, Ch.3].
3In this form they are given, e.g. in [1, Section 4].
4E.g. the property of monotonicity. Cf. the motivation for the clause (✷2) given in [9, p.46].
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ment of it.5 More precisely, for i, j ∈ {1, 2} we will denote the (i, j)-standard transla-
tion, or the standard translation induced by adopting (✷i)-clause together with (✸j)-
clause above, by STij.
Thus the inductive definitions of the (i, j)-standard x-translations run as follows:
STij(pn, x) = Pn(x);
STij(⊥, x) = ⊥;
STij(I ∧ J, x) = STij(I, x) ∧ STij(J, x);
STij(I ∨ J, x) = STij(I, x) ∨ STij(J, x);
STij(I → J, x) = ∀y(R(x, y)→ (STij(I, y)→ STij(J, y)));
ST1j(✷I, x) = ∀y(R✷(x, y)→ ST1j(I, y));
ST2j(✷I, x) = ∀y(R(x, y)→ ∀z(R✷(y, z)→ ST2j(I, z)));
STi1(✸I, x) = ∃y(R✸(x, y) ∧ STi1(I, y));
STi2(✸I, x) = ∀y(R(x, y)→ ∃z(R✸(y, z) ∧ STi2(I, z))).
Standard conditions are imposed on the variables x, y, and z.
2 Characterization of modal intuitionistic formulas:
definitions and main results
Our aim in the present paper is to characterize the expressive power of the four frag-
ments of correspondence language induced by the four above-mentioned versions of
(i, j)-standard translation of modal intuitionistic formulas via the suitable extension
of the notion of asimulation for the intuitionistic propositional logic. We will begin
by giving strict definitions of the four required extensions, and then formulate the two
versions of our main result for all the four considered fragments of correspondence
language in one full sweep.
It is easy to see that if one chooses (✸1) as a definition for the semantics of possi-
bility, then the respective standard translation of modal propositional formulas looks
almost as a notational variant of intuitionistic first-order logic. The semantics of di-
amond then resembles the semantics of intuitionistic existential quantifier, and the
semantics of box, if interpreted according to (✷2), resembles the semantics of intuition-
istic universal quantifier. The only difference is that the binary relation of existence
of object in a state is replaced by binary relations R✷ and R✸ respectively. Also, note
that now these ‘quantifiers’ are based on different binary relations rather than one and
the same, but the proofs given in the following section show that this little wrinkle is
of no consequence:
Definition 1. Let (M1, t), (M2, u) be two pointed Θ-models. A binary relation
A is called (2, 1)-modal 〈(M1, t), (M2, u)〉k-asimulation iff for any i, j ∈ {1, 2}, any
a¯m, a, c ∈ Ui, b¯m, b, d ∈ Uj , any unary predicate letter P ∈ Θ, the following conditions
5Every such standard translation is an obvious extension of the well known notion of standard
translation of propositional intuitionistic formulas, see e.g. [6, Definition 8.7].
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hold:
A ⊆
⋃
n>0
((Un1 × U
n
2 ) ∪ (U
n
2 × U
n
1 )) (p-type)
t A u (elem)
((a¯m, a) A (b¯m, b) ∧ a |=i P (x))⇒ b |=j P (x) (p-base)
((a¯m, a) A (b¯m, b) ∧ b Rj d ∧m < k)⇒
⇒ ∃c ∈ Ui(a Ri c ∧ (a¯m, a, c)
↔
A (b¯m, b, d)) (p-step)
((a¯m, a) A (b¯m, b) ∧ b Rj d ∧ d R✷j f ∧m+ 1 < k)⇒
⇒ ∃c, e ∈ Ui(a Ri c ∧ c R✷i e ∧ (a¯m, a, c, e) A (b¯m, b, d, f)) (p-box-2)
((a¯m, a) A (b¯m, b) ∧ a R✸i c ∧m < k)⇒
⇒ ∃d ∈ Uj(b R✸j d ∧ (a¯m, a, c) A (b¯m, b, d)) (p-diam-1)
Definition 2. Let (M1, t), (M2, u) be two pointed Θ-models. A binary relation A is
called (2, 1)-modal 〈(M1, t), (M2, u)〉-asimulation iff for any i, j ∈ {1, 2}, any a, c ∈ Ui,
b, d ∈ Uj , any unary predicate letter P ∈ Θ the following conditions hold:
A ⊆ (U1 × U2) ∪ (U2 × U1) (type)
t A u (elem)
(a A b ∧ a |=i P (x))⇒ b |=j P (x)) (base)
(a A b ∧ b Rj d)⇒ ∃c ∈ Ui(a Ri c ∧ c
↔
A d) (step)
(a A b ∧ b Rj d ∧ d R✷j f)⇒ ∃c, e ∈ Ui(a Ri c ∧ c R✷i e ∧ e A f) (box-2)
(a A b ∧ a R✸i c)⇒ ∃d ∈ Uj(b R✸j d ∧ c A d) (diam-1)
The situation changes very little when one adapts (✷1) instead of (✷2) as the clause
defining box. In fact, this clause is the standard one from classical modal logic, and to
accommodate for this change one only needs to pick a suitable asymmentric variant of
the bisimulation clause. The resulting definitions then look as follows:
Definition 3. Let (M1, t), (M2, u) be two pointed Θ-models. A binary relation
A is called (1, 1)-modal 〈(M1, t), (M2, u)〉k-asimulation iff for any i, j ∈ {1, 2}, any
a¯m, a, c ∈ Ui, b¯m, b, d ∈ Uj any unary predicate letter P ∈ Θ, the conditions (p-type),
(elem), (p-base), (p-step), (p-diam-1) are satisfied together with the following condi-
tion:
((a¯m, a) A (b¯m, b) ∧ b Rj d ∧m+ 1 < k)⇒
⇒ ∃c ∈ Ui(a R✷i c ∧ (a¯m, a, c) A (b¯m, b, d)) (p-box-1)
Definition 4. Let (M1, t), (M2, u) be two pointed Θ-models. A binary relation A is
called (1, 1)-modal 〈(M1, t), (M2, u)〉-asimulation iff for any i, j ∈ {1, 2}, any a, c ∈ Ui,
b, d ∈ Uj , any unary predicate letter P ∈ Θ the conditions (elem), (type), (base),
(step), (diam-1) are satisfied together with the following condition:
(a A b ∧ b Rj d)⇒ ∃c ∈ Ui(a R✷i c ∧ c A d) (box-1)
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If, instead of using clause (✸1), one chooses clause (✸2), things get somewhat more
complicated. In order get the right extensions of the basic asimulation notion, one has
to re-define asimulations as relation pairs rather than single binary relations. As our
first case we consider the set of correspondence formulas induced by (2, 2)-standard
translations of modal intuitionistic formulas:
Definition 5. Let (M1, t), (M2, u) be two pointed Θ-models. An ordered couple of
binary relations (A,B) is called (2, 2)-modal 〈(M1, t), (M2, u)〉k-asimulation iff for any
i, j ∈ {1, 2}, any a¯m, a, c ∈ Ui, b¯m, b, d ∈ Uj any unary predicate letter P ∈ Θ, the
conditions (p-type), (elem), (p-base), (p-step), (p-box-2) are satisfied together with the
following conditions:
B ⊆
⋃
n>0
((Un1 × U
n
2 ) ∪ (U
n
2 × U
n
1 )) (p-B-type)
((a¯m, a) A (b¯m, b) ∧ b Rj d ∧m+ 1 < k)⇒
⇒ ∃c ∈ Ui(a Ri c ∧ (a¯m, a, c) B (b¯m, b, d)) (p-diam-2(1))
((a¯m, a) B (b¯m, b) ∧ a R✸i c ∧m < k)⇒
⇒ ∃d ∈ Uj(b R✸j d ∧ (a¯m, a, c) A (b¯m, b, d)) (p-diam-2(2))
Definition 6. Let (M1, t), (M2, u) be two pointed Θ-models. An ordered couple of
binary relations (A,B) is called (2, 2)-modal 〈(M1, t), (M2, u)〉-asimulation iff for any
i, j ∈ {1, 2}, any a, c ∈ Ui, b, d ∈ Uj , any unary predicate letter P ∈ Θ the condi-
tions (elem), (type), (base), (step), (box-2) are satisfied together with the following
conditions:
B ⊆ (U1 × U2) ∪ (U2 × U1) (B-type)
(a A b ∧ b Rj d)⇒ ∃c ∈ Ui(a Ri c ∧ c B d) (diam-2(1))
(a B b ∧ a R✸i c)⇒ ∃d ∈ Uj(b R✸j d ∧ c A d) (diam-2(2))
The only case left is the one where one defines the satisfaction relation by using
(✸2) combined with (✷1). The respective definitions simply re-shuffle the conditions
mentioned in the previous versions:
Definition 7. Let (M1, t), (M2, u) be two pointed Θ-models. An ordered couple of
binary relation (A,B) is called (1, 2)-modal 〈(M1, t), (M2, u)〉k-asimulation iff for any
i, j ∈ {1, 2}, any a¯m, a ∈ Ui, b¯m, b, d ∈ Uj any unary predicate letter P ∈ Θ, the
conditions (p-type), (p-B-type), (elem), (p-base), (p-step), (p-box-1), (p-diam-2(1)),
and (p-diam-2(2)) are satisfied.
Definition 8. Let (M1, t), (M2, u) be two pointed Θ-models. An ordered couple of
binary relation (A,B) is called (2, 2)-modal 〈(M1, t), (M2, u)〉-asimulation iff for any
i, j ∈ {1, 2}, any a ∈ Ui, b, d ∈ Uj , any unary predicate letter P ∈ Θ the condi-
tions (elem), (B-type), (type), (base), (step), (box-1), (diam-2(1)) and (diam-2(2)) are
satisfied.
Before we reach the formulation of our main results, we still need one more technical
notion, that of invariance with respect to a class of relations:
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Definition 9. Let α be a class of relations such that for any A ∈ α there is a Θ and
there are Θ-models M1 and M2 such that (p-type) holds. Then a formula ϕ(x) is said
to be invariant with respect to α, iff for any A ∈ α for any corresponding Θ-modelsM1
and M2, and for any a ∈ U1 and b ∈ U2 it is true that:
(a A b ∧ a |=1 ϕ(x))⇒ b |=2 ϕ(x).
Of course, our primary examples of α will be the classes of all (i, j)-modal k-
asimulations for a given natural k and the classes of all (i, j)-modal asimulations. In
case j = 2 we identify the invariance with respect to (A,B) with invariance with respect
to its left projection A.
It turns out that the properties of invariance with respect to these relation classes
can be used to characterize modal intuitionistic fragment of FOL described by their
respective STij . More precisely, one can obtain the following theorems:
Theorem 1. Let i, j ∈ {1, 2}. A formula ϕ(x) is equivalent to an (i, j)-standard x-
translation of a modal intuitionistic formula iff there exists a k ∈ N such that ϕ(x) is
invariant with respect to (i, j)-modal k-asimulations.
Theorem 2. Let i, j ∈ {1, 2}. A formula ϕ(x) is equivalent to an (i, j)-standard x-
translation of an intuitionistic formula iff ϕ(x) is invariant with respect to (i, j)-modal
asimulations.
In what follows, we will also need to speak of basic asimulations. Using the no-
tation of Definitions 1 and 2, a basic 〈(M1, t), (M2, u)〉k-asimulation (resp. a basic
〈(M1, t), (M2, u)〉-asimulation) is a binary relation satisfying all the conditions of Def-
inition 1 (resp. Definition 2) but the last two.
3 Characterization of modal intuitionistic formulas:
the main case
Theorems 1 and 2 admit of four different instantiations of of i and j. The most difficult
ones seem to be the two instantiations with j = 2 since with them the situation bears
the least degree of analogy to the first-order intuitionistic logic. Therefore, in the
present section consider in some detail the case i = j = 2, whereas in the next one we
show how to adapt our proofs to the other cases.
In formulating our lemmas and presenting our proofs we will mimic the structure
of the proofs given in [7] and [8] and will sometimes refer the reader to their respective
parts in cases concerning basic asimulations and their properties.
3.1 Proof of Theorem 1
Lemma 1 (Key Lemma 1). Let ϕ(x) = ST22(I, x) for some modal intuitionistic for-
mula I, and let r(ϕ) = k. Let Σϕ ⊆ Θ, let (M1, t), (M2, u) be two pointed Θ-models,
and let (A,B) be
a (2, 2)-modal 〈(M1, t), (M2, u)〉l-asimulation. Then
((a¯m, a) A (b¯m, b) ∧m+ k ≤ l ∧ a |=i ϕ(x))⇒ b |=j ϕ(x),
for all i, j ∈ {1, 2}, (a¯m, a) ∈ U
m+1
i , and (b¯m, b) ∈ U
m+1
j .
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Proof. We proceed by induction on the complexity of I. In what follows we will ab-
breviate the induction hypothesis by IH.
First we note, that since (A,B) is a (2, 2)-modal 〈(M1, t), (M2, u)〉l-asimulation,
then A is a basic 〈(M1, t), (M2, u)〉l-asimulation, which means that we can re-use
Lemma 1 of [7] in order to handle the basis and the induction steps for ⊥, ∧, ∨,
and →. There remain the two cases which involve the modal operators:
Case 1. Let I = ✷J . Then
ϕ(x) = ∀y(R(x, y)→ ∀z(R✷(y, z)→ ST22(J, z))).
Assume that:
a |=i ∀y(R(x, y)→ ∀z(R✷(y, z)→ ST22(J, z))) (1)
(a¯m, a) A (b¯m, b) (2)
m+ r(ϕ(x)) ≤ l (3)
Moreover, it follows from definition of r that:
r(ϕ(x)) ≥ 2 (4)
r(ST (J, z)) ≤ r(ϕ(x)) − 2 (5)
Now, consider arbitrary d, f ∈ Uj such that b Rj d and d R✷j f . Since (3) and (4)
clearly imply that m + 1 < l, it follows from (2) and (p-box-2) that one can choose
c, e ∈ Ui, such that:
a Ri c (6)
c R✷i e (7)
(a¯m, a, c, e) A (b¯m, b, d, f) (8)
So, we reason as follows:
e |=i ST22(J, z) (from (1), (6), and (7)) (9)
m+ 2 + r(ST22(J, z)) ≤ l (from (3) and (5)) (10)
f |=j ST22(J, z) (from (8), (9), (10) by IH) (11)
Since d was chosen to be an arbitrary Rj-successor of b, and f an arbitrary R✷j-
successor of d, this means that
b |=j ∀y(R(x, y)→ ∀z(R✷(y, z)→ ST22(J, z))),
and we are done.
Case 2. Let I = ✸J . Then
ϕ(x) = ∀y(R(x, y)→ ∃z(R✸(y, z) ∧ ST22(J, z))).
Assume that:
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a |=i ∀y(R(x, y)→ ∃z(R✸(y, z) ∧ ST22(J, z))) (12)
(a¯m, a) A (b¯m, b) (13)
m+ r(ϕ(x)) ≤ l (14)
Moreover, it follows from definition of r that:
r(ϕ(x)) ≥ 2 (15)
r(ST (J, y)) ≤ r(ϕ(x)) − 2 (16)
Since (14) and (15) clearly imply that m+1 < l, it follows from (13) and (p-diam-2(1))
that one can choose a c ∈ Ui, such that:
a Ri c (17)
(a¯m, a, c) B (b¯m, b, d) (18)
Now from (12) and (17) it follows that we can choose an e ∈ Ui such that
c R✸i e (19)
e |=i ST22(J, z) (20)
Also, by (18), condition (p-diam-2(2)), and the fact that m+ 1 < l, we have:
∃f ∈ Uj(d R✸j f ∧ (a¯m, a, c, e) A (b¯m, b, d, f)) (21)
We further get that:
m+ 2 + r(ST22(J, z)) ≤ l (from (14) and (16)) (22)
∃f ∈ Uj(d R✸i f ∧ (f |=j ST22(J, z))) (by IH from (20), (21), and (22)) (23)
Since d was chosen to be an arbitrary Rj-successor of b, this means that
b |=j ∀y(R(x, y)→ ∃z(R✸(y, z) ∧ ST22(J, z))),
and we are done.
We use Lemma 1 to derive the ‘easy’ direction of (2, 2)-instantiation of Theorem 1:
Corollary 1. If ϕ(x) is equivalent to a (2, 2)-standard x-translation of an intuitionistic
formula, then there exists k ∈ N such that ϕ(x) is invariant with respect to (2, 2)-modal
k-asimulations.
Proof. Let ϕ(x) be logically equivalent to ST22(I, x) for some intuitionistic formula I,
and let r(ST22(I, x)) = k. Then it follows from Lemma 1 (setting i := 1, j := 2,m := 0,
and l := k) that ST22(I, x) is invariant with respect to (2, 2)-modal k-asimulations, and
so is ϕ(x).
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On our way to the inverse direction of (2, 2)-instantiation of Theorem 1 we first
need a new piece of notation. For a formula ϕ(x) in the correspondence language,
variable x and a natural l, we denote with int(ϕ, x, l) the set of all (2, 2)-standard
x-translations of intuitionistic formulas, which happen to be (Σϕ, x, l)-formulas. We
use this notation to define three types of formulas which are important components in
the proofs to follow. Let Σϕ ⊆ Θ, let M be a Θ-model and let a ∈ U . Then:
tpl(ϕ(x),M, a) = {ψ(x) ∈ int(ϕ, x, l) |M,a |= ψ(x)},
tpl(ϕ(x),M, a) = {ψ(x) ∈ int(ϕ, x, l) |M,a 6|= ψ(x)},
and, further:
impl(ϕ(x),M, g) =
⋂
{tpl(ϕ(x),M, b) | ι(R✸)(a, b)}
We mention the following obvious link between different pieces of notation just
defined. Under the above-mentioned assumptions about ϕ(x), l, Θ, M , a, and for any
M be a Θ-model M ′ and a′ ∈ U ′ we have:
tpl(ϕ(x),M, a) ⊆ tpl(ϕ(x),M
′, a′)⇔ tpl(ϕ(x),M
′, a′) ⊆ tpl(ϕ(x),M, a).
We then invoke the following well known-fact about classical first-order logic:
Lemma 2. For any finite predicate vocabulary Θ, any variable x and any natural k
there are, up to logical equivalence, only finitely many (Θ, x, k)-formulas.
This fact is proved as Lemma 3.4 in [5, pp. 189–190]. It implies that for every set
of formulas, which have one of the forms int(ϕ, x, l), tpl(ϕ(x),M, a), tpl(ϕ(x),M, a),
impl(ϕ(x),M, a) there exist a finite subset collecting the logical equivalents for all
the formulas in the set. Moreover, it allows us to collect logical equivalents of all
(2, 2)-standard translations of intuitionistic formulas which are true together with a
given formula at some pointed model in a single formula which we will call a complete
conjunction:
Definition 10. Let ϕ(x) be a formula. A conjunction Ψ(x) of formulas from int(ϕ, x, k)
is called a complete (ϕ, x, k)-conjunction iff there is a pointed model (M,a) such that
M,a |= Ψ(x) ∧ ϕ(x), and for any ψ(x) ∈ tpk(ϕ(x),M, a) we have Ψ(x) |= ψ(x).
The two following lemmas summarize some rather obvious properties of complete
conjunctions:
Lemma 3. For any formula ϕ(x), any natural k ≥ 1, any Θ such that Σϕ ⊆ Θ and any
pointed Θ-model (M,a) such that M,a |= ϕ(x) there is a complete (ϕ, x, k)-conjunction
Ψ(x) such that M,a |= Ψ(x) ∧ ϕ(x).
Proof. Consider tpk(ϕ(x),M, a). This set is non-empty since ST22(⊥ → ⊥, x) will be
true at (M,a). Due to Lemma 2, we can choose in this set a non-empty finite subset
Γ(x) such that any formula from tpk(ϕ(x),M, a) is logically equivalent to (and hence fol-
lows from) a formula in Γ(x). By Γ(x) ⊆ tpk(ϕ(x),M, a), we also haveM,a |=
∧
Γ(x),
therefore,
∧
Γ(x) is a complete (ϕ, x, k)-conjunction.
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Lemma 4. For any formula ϕ(x) and any natural k there are, up to logical equivalence,
only finitely many complete (ϕ, x, k)-conjunctions.
Proof. It suffices to observe that for any formula ϕ(x) and any natural k, a complete
(ϕ, x, k)-conjunction is a (Σϕ, x, k)-formula. Our lemma then follows from Lemma
2.
As a result, we are now able to establish the ‘hard’ right-to-left direction of Theorem
1:
Lemma 5 (Key Lemma 2). Let k = r(ϕ(x)) and let ϕ(x) be invariant with respect to
(2, 2)-modal k-asimulations. Then ϕ(x) is equivalent to a (2, 2)-standard x-translation
of a modal intuitionistic formula.
Proof. We may assume that both ϕ(x) and ¬ϕ(x) are satisfiable, since both ⊥ and ⊤
are obviously invariant with respect to (2, 2)-modal k-asimulations and we have, for
example, the following valid formulas:
⊥ ↔ ST22(⊥, x),⊤ ↔ ST22(⊥ → ⊥, x).
Wemay also assume that there are two complete (ϕ, x, k+2)-conjunctions Ψ(x),Ψ′(x)
such that Ψ′(x) |= Ψ(x), and both formulas Ψ(x) ∧ ϕ(x) and Ψ′(x) ∧ ¬ϕ(x) are satis-
fiable.
For suppose otherwise. Then take the set of all complete (ϕ, x, k + 2)-conjunctions
Ψ(x) such that the formula Ψ(x) ∧ ϕ(x) is satisfiable. This set is non-empty, be-
cause ϕ(x) is satisfiable, and by Lemma 3, it can be satisfied only together with some
complete (ϕ, x, k + 2)-conjunction. Now, using Lemma 4, choose in it a finite non-
empty subset {Ψi1(x) . . . ,Ψin(x) } such that any complete (ϕ, x, k + 2)-conjunction
is equivalent to an element of this subset. We can show that ϕ(x) is logically equiv-
alent to Ψi1(x) ∨ . . . ∨ Ψin(x). In fact, if M,a |= ϕ(x) then, by Lemma 3, at least
one complete (ϕ, x, k+2)-conjunction is true at (M,a) and therefore, its equivalent in
{Ψi1(x) . . . ,Ψin(x) } is also true at (M,a), and so, finally we have
M,a |= Ψi1(x) ∨ . . . ∨Ψin(x).
In the other direction, ifM,a |= Ψi1(x)∨ . . .∨Ψin(x), then for some 1 ≤ j ≤ n we have
M,a |= Ψij (x). Then, since Ψij (x) |= Ψij (x) and by the choice of Ψij (x) the formula
Ψij (x) ∧ ϕ(x) is satisfiable, so, by our assumption, the formula Ψij (x) ∧ ¬ϕ(x) must
be unsatisfiable, and hence ϕ(x) must follow from Ψij (x). But in this case we will
have M,a |= ϕ(x) as well. So ϕ(x) is logically equivalent to Ψi1(x) ∨ . . . ,∨Ψin(x) but
the latter formula, being a disjunction of conjunctions of (2, 2)-standard x-translations
of modal intuitionistic formulas, is itself a (2, 2)-standard x-translation of a modal
intuitionistic formula, and so we are done.
If, on the other hand, one can take two complete (ϕ, x, k+2)-conjunctions Ψ(x),Ψ′(x)
such that Ψ′(x) |= Ψ(x), and formulas Ψ(x) ∧ ϕ(x) and Ψ′(x) ∧ ¬ϕ(x) are satisfiable,
we reason as follows. Take a pointed Σϕ-model (M1, t) such that t |=1 Ψ(x)∧ϕ(x), and
that any formula ψ(x) ∈ tpk+2(ϕ(x),M1, t) follows from Ψ(x), and take any pointed
model (M2, u) such that u |=2 Ψ
′(x) ∧ ¬ϕ(x).
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We can construct an (2, 2)-modal 〈(M1, t), (M2, u)〉k-asimulation and thus obtain a
contradiction in the following way. We define it as the ordered couple (A,B), where
for arbitrary i, j ∈ { 1, 2 } and (a¯m, a) ∈ U
m+1
i , (b¯m, b) ∈ U
m+1
j we set:
(a¯m, a) A (b¯m, b)⇔ (m ≤ k ∧ tpk−m+2(ϕ(x),Mi, a) ⊆ tpk−m+2(ϕ(x),Mj , b)),
and, for B:
(a¯m, a) B (b¯m, b)⇔ (m ≤ k ∧ impk−m+1(ϕ(x),Mj , b) ⊆ impk−m+1(ϕ(x),Mi, a)).
With these definitions, we can show that A is a basic 〈(M1, t), (M2, u)〉k-asimulation,
arguing as in Theorem 1 of [7]. Therefore, in order to show that (A,B) is a (2, 2)-modal
〈(M1, t), (M2, u)〉k-asimulation, we only need to verify conditions (p-B-type), (p-box-2),
(p-diam-2(1)), and (p-diam-2(2)). It is clear that B satisfies (p-B-type).
To verify condition (p-box-2), take any (a¯m, a) A (b¯m, b) such that m + 1 < k
and any d, f ∈ Uj such that b Rj d and d R✷j f . In this case we will also have
m + 2 ≤ k. Then consider tpk−m(ϕ(x),Mj , f). This set is non-empty, since by our
assumption we have k −m ≥ 0. Therefore, as we have r(ST22(⊥, x)) = 0, we will also
have ST22(⊥, x) ∈ tpk−m(ϕ(x),Mj , f). Then, according to our Lemma 2, there exists a
finite non-empty set of logical equivalents for tpk−m(ϕ(x),Mj , f). Choosing this finite
set, we in fact choose some finite {ST22(J1, x) . . . ST22(Jq, x) } ⊆ tpk−m(ϕ(x),Mj , f)
such that
∀ψ(x) ∈ tpk−m(ϕ(x),Mj , f)(ψ(x) |= ST22(J1, x) ∨ . . . ∨ ST22(Jq, x)).
But then we obtain that
b 6|=j ST22(✷(J1 ∨ . . . ∨ Jq), x).
In fact, d, f jointly falsify this boxed disjunction for (Mj , b). But, given that
{ST22(J1, x) . . . ST22(Jq, x) } ⊆ tpk−m(ϕ(x),Mj , f),
the standard translation of boxed disjunction under consideration must be in
tpk−m+2(ϕ,Mj , b). Note, further, that by (a¯m, a) A (b¯m, b) we have
tpk−m+2(ϕ(x),Mi, a) ⊆ tpk−m+2(ϕ(x),Mj , b),
thus:
tpk−m+2(ϕ(x),Mj , b) ⊆ tpk−m+2(ϕ(x),Mi, a),
and therefore this boxed disjunction must be false at (Mi, a) as well. But then take
any c, e ∈ Ui such that a Ri c, c R✷i e and c, e falsify the boxed disjunction under
consideration. By choice of {ST (J1, x) . . . ST (Jq, x) } it follows that
tpk−m(ϕ(x),Mj , f) ⊆ tpk−m(ϕ(x),Mi, e),
and thus
tpk−m(ϕ(x),Mi, e) ⊆ tpk−m(ϕ(x),Mj , f),
But then, again by the definition of A, and given the fact that m + 2 ≤ k, we must
also have (a¯m, a, c, e) A (b¯m, b, d, f), and so condition (p-box-2) holds.
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To verify condition (p-diam-2(1)), take any (a¯m, a) A (b¯m, b) such that m + 1 < k
and any d ∈ Uj such that b Rj d. In this case we will also have m + 2 ≤ k.
Then consider impk−m(ϕ(x),Mj , d). This set is non-empty, since by our assump-
tion we have k −m ≥ 0. Therefore, as we have r(ST22(⊥, x)) = 0, we will also have
ST22(⊥, x) ∈ impk−m(ϕ(x),Mj , d). Then, according to our Lemma 2, there exists a fi-
nite non-empty set of logical equivalents for impk−m(ϕ(x),Mj , d). Choosing this finite
set, we in fact choose some finite
{ST22(J1, x) . . . ST22(Jq, x) } ⊆ impk−m(ϕ(x),Mj , d)
such that
∀ψ(x) ∈ impk−m(ϕ(x),Mj , d)(ψ(x) |= ST22(J1, x) ∨ . . . ∨ ST22(Jq, x)).
But then we obtain that
b 6|=j ST22(✸(J1 ∨ . . . ∨ Jq), x).
In fact, d falsify this disjunction for (Mj , b). But, given that
{ST22(J1, x) . . . ST22(Jq, x) } ⊆ impk−m(ϕ(x),Mj , d),
the standard translation of the modalized disjunction under consideration must be in
tpk−m+2(ϕ(x),Mj , b). Note, further, that by (a¯m, a) A (b¯m, b) we have
tpk−m+2(ϕ(x),Mi, a) ⊆ tpk−m+2(ϕ(x),Mj , b),
thus:
tpk−m+2(ϕ(x),Mj , b) ⊆ tpk−m+2(ϕ(x),Mi, a),
and therefore the modalized disjunction must be false at (Mi, a) as well. But then take
any c ∈ Ui such that a Ri c, and for every e, such that c R✸i e, we have
e 6|=j ST22(J1, x) ∨ . . . ∨ ST22(Jq, x)
By choice of {ST22(J1, x) . . . ST22(Jq, x) } it follows that
impk−m(ϕ(x),Mj , d) ⊆ impk−m(ϕ(x),Mi, c),
But then, again by the definition of B, and given the fact that m + 2 ≤ k, we must
also have (a¯m, a, c) B (b¯m, b, d), and so condition (p-diam-2(1)) holds.
Finally, to verify condition (p-diam-2(2)), take any (a¯m, a) A (b¯m, b) such that
m < k and any c ∈ Ui such that a R✸i c. In this case we will also have m + 1 ≤ k.
Then consider tpk−m+1(ϕ(x),Mi, c). This set is non-empty, since by our assumption
we have k −m ≥ 1. Therefore, as we have r(ST22(⊥ → ⊥, x)) = 1, we will also have
ST22(⊥ → ⊥, x) ∈ tpk−m+1(ϕ(x),Mi, c). Then, according to our Lemma 2, there exists
a finite non-empty set of logical equivalents for tpk−m+1(ϕ(x),Mi, c). Choosing this fi-
nite set, we in fact choose some finite {ST22(I1, x) . . . ST22(Ip, x) } ⊆ tpk−m+1(ϕ(x),Mi, c)
such that
∀ψ(x) ∈ tpk−m+1(ϕ(x),Mi, c)(ST22(I1, x) ∧ . . . ∧ ST22(Ip, x) |= ψ(x)).
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But then we obtain that
ST22((I1 ∧ . . . ∧ Ip), x) /∈ impk−m+1(ϕ(x),Mi, a).
Note, further, that by (a¯m, a) B (b¯m, b) we have
impk−m+1(ϕ(x),Mj , b) ⊆ impk−m+1(ϕ(x),Mi, a),
thus:
ST22((I1 ∧ . . . ∧ Ip), x) /∈ impk−m+2(ϕ(x),Mj , b).
But then take any d ∈ Uj such that b R✸j d and we have
d |=j ST22(I1, x) ∧ . . . ∧ ST22(Ip, x).
By choice of {ST22(I1, x) . . . ST22(Ip, x) } it follows that
tpk−m+1(ϕ(x),Mi, c) ⊆ tpk−m+1(ϕ(x),Mj , d),
But then, again by the definition of A, and given the fact that m + 1 ≤ k, we must
also have (a¯m, a, c) A (b¯m, b, d), and so condition (p-diam-2(2)) holds.
Therefore (A,B) is a (2, 2)-modal 〈(M1, t), (M2, u)〉k-asimulation, and we have got
our contradiction in place.
We can now finish the proof of (2, 2)-instantiation of Theorem 1:
Proof. The ‘only if’ direction we have by Corollary 1. In the other direction, let ϕ(x) be
invariant with respect to k-asimulations for some k. If k ≤ r(ϕ), then every (2, 2)-modal
r(ϕ)-asimulation is a (2, 2)-modal k-asimulation, so ϕ(x) is invariant with respect to
(2, 2)-modal r(ϕ)-asimulations and hence, by Lemma 5, ϕ(x) is equivalent to a standard
x-translation of an intuitionistic formula. If, on the other hand, r(ϕ) < k, then set
l := k − r(ϕ) and consider variables y¯l not occurring in ϕ(x). Then r(∀y¯lϕ(x)) = k
and ϕ(x) is logically equivalent to ∀y¯lϕ(x), so the latter formula is also invariant with
respect to k-asimulations, and hence by Theorem 5 ∀y¯lϕ(x) is logically equivalent to a
standard x-translation of an intuitionistic formula. But then ϕ(x) is equivalent to this
standard x-translation as well.
3.2 Proof of Theorem 2
We now turn to the proof of (2, 2)-instantiation of Theorem 2. The ‘only if’ direction
we again have by Corollary 1:
Corollary 2. If ϕ(x) is equivalent to a (2, 2)-standard x-translation of an intuitionistic
formula, then ϕ(x) is invariant with respect to (2, 2)-modal asimulations.
Proof. Let ϕ(x) be logically equivalent to ST22(I, x) for some intuitionistic formula I.
For an arbitrary Θ ⊇ Σϕ, Θ-models M1 and M2, and arbitrary t ∈ U1, u ∈ U2 let
(A,B) be a (2, 2)-modal 〈(M1, t), (M2, u)〉-asimulation, so that we have t A u. Assume
that
t |=1 ϕ(x).
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Then consider the ordered couple (A′, B′) such that:
A′ = { 〈(a¯m, a), (b¯m, b; )〉 |
| ∃i, j({ i, j } = { 1, 2 } ∧ a¯m, a ∈ Ui ∧ b¯m, b ∈ Uj ∧ a A b) };
B′ = { 〈(a¯m, a), (b¯m, b; )〉 |
| ∃i, j({ i, j } = { 1, 2 } ∧ a¯m, a ∈ Ui ∧ b¯m, b ∈ Uj ∧ a B b) };
It is straightforward to verify that (A′, B′) is a (2, 2)-modal 〈(M1, t), (M2, u)〉k-asimulation
for every k ∈ N. Moreover, we still have t A′ u. By Corollary 1, there is a natural
k, such that ϕ(x) is invariant with respect to (2, 2)-modal k-asimulation, therefore we
have
u |=2 ϕ(x).
Since the (2, 2)-modal 〈(M1, t), (M2, u)〉-asimulation (A,B) was chosen arbitrarily, this
means that ϕ(x) is invariant with respect to (2, 2)-modal asimulations.
To proceed, we need to introduce some further notions and results from classical
model theory. For a model M and a¯n ∈ U let [M, a¯n] be the extension of M with a¯n
as new individual constants interpreted as themselves. It is easy to see that there is a
simple relation between the truth of a formula at a sequence of elements of a Θ-model
and the truth of its substitution instance in an extension of the above-mentioned kind;
namely, for any Θ-model M , any Θ-formula ϕ(y¯n, w¯m) and any a¯n, b¯m ∈ U it is true
that:
[M, a¯n], b¯m |= ϕ(a¯n, w¯m)⇔M, a¯n, b¯m |= ϕ(y¯n, w¯m).
We will call a theory of M (and write Th(M)) the set of all first-order sentences
true atM . We will call an n-type ofM a set of formulas Γ(w¯n) consistent with Th(M).
Definition 11. Let M be a Θ-model. M is ω-saturated iff for all k ∈ N and for all
a¯n ∈ U , every k-type Γ(w¯k) of [M, a¯n] is satisfiable in [M, a¯n].
Definition of ω-saturation normally requires satisfiability of 1-types only. However,
our modification is equivalent to the more familiar version: see e.g. [4, Lemma 4.31, p.
73].
It is known that every model can be elementarily extended to an ω-saturated model;
in other words, the following lemma holds:
Lemma 6. Let M be a Θ-model. Then there is an ω-saturated extension M ′ of M
such that for all a¯n ∈ U and every Θ-formula ϕ(w¯n):
M, a¯n |= ϕ(w¯n)⇔M
′, a¯n |= ϕ(w¯n).
The latter lemma is a trivial corollary of e.g. [3, Lemma 5.1.14, p. 216].
A very useful property of ω-saturated models is that one can define among them
(2, 2)-modal asimulations more or less according to the strategy assumed in the proof
of Lemma 5. In order to do this, however, we need to re-define the types used in the
above proof. We collect the required changes in the following definition:
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Definition 12. Let M be a Θ-model, t ∈ U and let x be a variable in correspondence
language. Then we define intx(Θ) to be the set of all Θ-formulas that are (2, 2)-standard
x-translations of modal intuitionistic formulas. We further set:
tpx(M, t) = {ϕ(x) ∈ intx(Θ) |M, t |= ϕ(x)};
tpx(M, t) = {ϕ(x) ∈ intx(Θ) |M, t 6|= ϕ(x)};
impx(M, t) =
⋂
{tpx(M,u) | ι(R✸)(t, u)}.
The analogue of ‘contrapositive’ scheme mentioned above holds, namely, for arbi-
trary models M , M ′, and elements a ∈ U , and a′ ∈ U ′ we have:
tpx(M,a) ⊆ tpx(M
′, a′)⇔ tpx(M
′, a′) ⊆ tpx(M,a).
The following lemma gives the precise version of the above statement:
Lemma 7 (Key Lemma 3). Let M1, M2 be ω-saturated Θ-models, let t ∈ U1, and
t′ ∈ U2 be such that tp(M1, t) ⊆ tp(M2, t
′). Let x be a variable in correspondence
language. Then the ordered couple (A,B) such that:
A = { 〈a, b〉 | ∃i, j({ i, j } = { 1, 2 } ∧ tpx(Mi, a) ⊆ tpx(Mj, b)) }
and:
B = { 〈a, b〉 | ∃i, j({ i, j } = { 1, 2 } ∧ impx(Mi, a) ⊇ impx(Mj, b)) }
is a (2, 2)-modal 〈(M1, t), (M2, t
′)〉-asimulation.
Proof. It is evident that B satisfies (B-type), and arguing as in Lemma 8 of [8], we can
show that A is a basic 〈(M1, t), (M2, t
′)〉-asimulation. So we are left to consider the
last three conditions of Definition 6.
To verify condition (box-2), choose any i, j such that { i, j } = { 1, 2 }, any a ∈ Ui,
b ∈ Uj such that a A b, that is to say, tpx(Mi, a) ⊆ tpx(Mj , b) and choose any d, f ∈ Uj
for which we have b Rj d and d R✷j f .
Consider tpx(Mj, f). If {ST22(J1, x) . . . ST22(Jq, x) } is a finite subset of this type,
then we have
b 6|=j ST (✷(J1 ∨ . . . ∨ Jq), x).
Since by contraposition of a A b we have that tpx(Mj , b) ⊆ tpx(Mi, a), we obtain that
a 6|=i ST (✷(J1 ∨ . . . ∨ Jq), x).
This means that every finite subset of the type
{R(a, y), R✷(y, x) } ∪ {¬ψ(x) | ψ(x) ∈ tpx(Mj , f)}
is satisfiable at [Mi, a]. Therefore, by compactness of first-order logic, this set is con-
sistent with Th([Mi, a]) and, by ω-saturation of both M1 and M2, it must be satisfied
in [Mi, a] by some c, e ∈ Ui. So for any such c and e we will have a Ri c, c R✷i e and,
moreover,
∀ψ ∈ tpx(Mj , f)(e 6|=i ψ(x)).
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Thus we have that tpx(Mj , f) ⊆ tpx(Mi, e), and further, by contraposition, that
tpx(Mi, e) ⊆ tpx(Mj , f). Thus we get that e A f and condition (box-2) is verified.
To verify condition (diam-2(1)), choose any i, j such that { i, j } = { 1, 2 }, any
a ∈ Ui, b ∈ Uj such that a A b, that is to say, tpx(Mi, a) ⊆ tpx(Mj , b) and choose any
d ∈ Uj for which we have b Rj d.
Consider impx(Mj , d). If {ST22(J1, x) . . . ST22(Jq, x) } is a finite subset of this type,
then we have
b 6|=j ST (✸(J1 ∨ . . . ∨ Jq), x).
Since by contraposition of a A b we have that tpx(Mj , b) ⊆ tpx(Mi, a), we obtain that
a 6|=i ST (✸(J1 ∨ . . . ∨ Jq), x).
This means that every finite subset of the type
{R(a, x) } ∪ {∀y(R✸(x, y)→ ¬ψ(y)) | ψ(x) ∈ impx(Mj , d)}
is satisfiable at [Mi, a]. Therefore, by compactness of first-order logic, this set is con-
sistent with Th([Mi, a]) and, by ω-saturation of both M1 and M2, it must be satisfied
in [Mi, a] by some c ∈ Ui. So for any such c we will have a Ri c and, moreover,
(∀ψ(x) ∈ impx(Mj, d))(∀e ∈ Ui)(R✸i(c, e)⇒ e 6|=i ψ(x)).
Thus we have that impx(Mj , d) ⊆ impx(Mi, c), and therefore, that c B d. Thus
condition (diam-2(1)) is verified.
Finally, to verify condition (diam-2(2)), choose any i, j such that { i, j } = { 1, 2 },
any a ∈ Ui, b ∈ Uj such that a B b, that is to say, impx(Mj , b) ⊆ impx(Mi, a) and
choose any c ∈ Ui for which we have a R✸i c.
Consider tpx(Mi, c). If {ST22(I1, x) . . . ST22(Ip, x) } is a finite subset of this type,
then we have
c |=i ST ((I1 ∧ . . . ∧ Ip), x).
Therefore, the set {ST22(I1, x) . . . ST22(Ip, x) } is disjoint from impx(Mi, a), and thus
it is also disjoint from impx(Mj , b). Therefore, the formula ST (✸(I1 ∧ . . . ∧ Ip), x) is
also verified by some R✸j-successor of b. More formally, this means that every finite
subset of the type
{R✸(b, x) } ∪ {ψ(x) | ψ(x) ∈ tpx(Mi, c)}
is satisfiable at [Mj , b]. Therefore, by compactness of first-order logic, this set is con-
sistent with Th([Mj, b]) and, by ω-saturation of both M1 and M2, it must be satisfied
in [Mj, b] by some d ∈ Uj. So for any such d we will have b R✸j d and, moreover,
(∀ψ(x) ∈ tpx(Mi, c))(d |=j ψ(x)).
Thus we have that tpx(Mi, c) ⊆ tpx(Mj , c), and therefore, that c A d. The condition
(diam-2(2)) is verified.
We are prepared now to prove the hard part of (2, 2)-instantiation of Theorem 2:
Lemma 8. Let ϕ(x) be invariant with respect to (2, 2)-modal asimulations. Then ϕ(x)
is equivalent to (2, 2)-standard translation of a modal intuitionistic formula.
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Proof. We may assume that ϕ(x) is satisfiable, for ⊥ is clearly invariant with respect
to (2, 2)-modal asimulations and ⊥ ↔ ST22(⊥, x) is a valid formula. Throughout this
proof, will write ic(ϕ(x)) for the following set:
{ψ(x) ∈ intx(Σϕ) | ϕ(x) |= ψ(x)}
Our strategy will be to show that ic(ϕ(x)) |= ϕ(x). Once this is done, we will
apply compactness of first-order logic and conclude that ϕ(x) is equivalent to a finite
conjunction of standard (2, 2)-modal x-translations of intuitionistic formulas and hence
to a standard x-translation of the corresponding intuitionistic conjunction.
To show this, take any Σϕ-model M1 and a ∈ U1 such that a |=1 ic(ϕ(x)). Then,
of course, we also have ic(ϕ(x)) ⊆ tpx(M1, a). Such a model exists, because ϕ(x) is
satisfiable and ic(ϕ(x)) will be satisfied in any model satisfying ϕ(x). Then we can also
choose a Σϕ-model M2 and b ∈ U2 such that b |=2 ϕ(x) and tpx(M2, b) ⊆ tpx(M1, a).
For suppose otherwise. Then for any Σϕ-model M such that U ⊆ N and any c ∈ U
such that M, c |= ϕ(x) we can choose a modal intuitionistic formula I(M,c) such that
ST22(I(M,c), x) is in tpx(M, c) but not in tpx(M1, a). Then consider the set
S = {ϕ(x) } ∪ {¬ST22(I(M,c), x) |M, c |= ϕ(x) }
Let {ϕ(x),¬ST22(I1, x) . . . ,¬ST22(Iq, x) } be a finite subset of this set. If this set is
unsatisfiable, then we must have ϕ(x) |= ST22(I1, x) ∨ . . . ∨ ST22(Iq , x), but then we
will also have (ST22(I1, x) ∨ . . . ∨ ST22(Iq, x)) ∈ ic(ϕ(x)) ⊆ tpx(M1, a), and hence
(ST22(I1, x) ∨ . . . ∨ ST22(Iq , x)) will be true at (M1, a). But then at least one of
ST22(I1, x) . . . ST22(Iq , x) must also be true at (M1, a), which contradicts the choice of
these formulas. Therefore, every finite subset of S is satisfiable, and, by compactness,
S itself is satisfiable as well. But then, by the Lo¨wenheim-Skolem property, we can
take a Σϕ-model M
′ such that U ′ ⊆ N and g ∈ U ′ such that S is true at (M ′, g) and
this will be a model for which we will have both M ′, g |= ST22(I(M ′,g), x) by choice of
I(M ′,g) and M
′, g 6|= ST22(I(M ′,g), x) by satisfaction of S, a contradiction.
Therefore, we will assume in the following that some Σϕ-modelM2 and some b ∈ U2
are such that a |=1 ic(ϕ(x)), b |=2 ϕ(x), and tpx(M2, b) ⊆ tpx(M1, a). According
to Lemma 6, there exist ω-saturated elementary extensions M ′, M ′′ of M1 and M2,
respectively. We have:
M1, a |= ϕ(x)⇔M
′, a |= ϕ(x) (24)
M ′′, b |= ϕ(x) (25)
Also, since M1, M2 are elementarily equivalent to M
′, M ′′, respectively, we have
tpx(M
′′, b) = tpx(M2, b) ⊆ tpx(M1, a) = tpx(M
′, a).
By ω-saturation of M ′, M ′′ and Lemma 7, the ordered couple (A,B) such that:
A = { 〈c, d〉 | ∃µ, µ′({µ, µ′ } = {M ′,M ′′ } ∧ tpx(µ, c) ⊆ tpx(µ
′, d)) }
B = { 〈c, d〉 | ∃µ, µ′({µ, µ′ } = {M ′,M ′′ } ∧ impx(µ, c) ⊇ impx(µ
′, d)) }
is a (2, 2)-modal 〈(M ′′, b), (M ′, a)〉-asimulation. But then by (25) and invariance of
ϕ(x) we get M ′, a |= ϕ(x), and further, by (24) we conclude that M1, a |= ϕ(x).
Therefore, ϕ(x) in fact follows from ic(ϕ(x)).
Theorem 2 now follows from Corollary 2 and Lemma 8.
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4 Other cases
We now briefly show how to obtain the proofs for the other three instantiations of
Theorems 1 and 2. The general scheme of the proofs in these cases is very similar
to the the proofs given in the previous section. The main difference is that in the
other cases we need to assume different sets of conditions in the definitions of modal
k-asimulations and modal asimulations simpliciter. This affects the three key lemmas
of the previous section, namely, Lemmas 1, 5, and 7, in that some parts of their proofs
become irrelevant and some new parts need to be supplied instead. Accordingly, when
treating the other three instantiations of our main results below, we mainly concentrate
on how to revise the proofs of these three lemmas.
4.1 Case i = 1, j = 2
In order to obtain the proofs of Theorems 1 and 2 one needs to revise the proofs given
in Section in the following way:
Ad Key Lemma 1:
Revise the inductive step in case where I = ✷J as follows:
In this case we have
ϕ(x) = ∀y(R✷(x, y)→ ST12(J, y))).
Assume that:
a |=i ∀y(R✷(x, y)→ ST12(J, y))) (26)
(a¯m, a) A (b¯m, b) (27)
m+ r(ϕ(x)) ≤ l (28)
Moreover, it follows from definition of r that:
r(ϕ(x)) ≥ 1 (29)
r(ST (J, y)) ≤ r(ϕ(x)) − 1 (30)
Now, consider arbitrary d ∈ Uj such that b R✷j d. Since (28) and (29) clearly imply
that m < l, it follows from (27) and (p-box-1) that one can choose a c ∈ Ui, such that:
a R✷i c (31)
(a¯m, a, c) A (b¯m, b, d) (32)
So, we reason as follows:
c |=i ST12(J, y) (from (26) and (31)) (33)
m+ 1 + r(ST12(J, y)) ≤ l (from (28) and (30)) (34)
d |=j ST12(J, y) (from (32), (33), (34) by IH) (35)
Since d was chosen to be an arbitrary R✷j-successor of b, this means that
b |=j ∀y(R✷(x, y)→ ST12(J, y))),
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and we are done.
Ad Key Lemma 2:
Replace the verification of condition (p-box-2) with the following verification of
condition (p-box-1):
Take any (a¯m, a) A (b¯m, b) such that m < k and any d ∈ Uj such that b R✷j d.
In this case we will also have m + 1 ≤ k. Then consider tpk−m(ϕ(x),Mj , d). This
set is non-empty, since by our assumption we have k − m ≥ 0. Therefore, as we
have r(ST12(⊥, x)) = 0, we will also have ST12(⊥, x) ∈ tpk−m+1(ϕ(x),Mj , d). Then,
according to Lemma 2, there exists a finite non-empty set of logical equivalents for
tpk−m+1(ϕ(x),Mj , d). Choosing this finite set, we in fact choose some finite
{ST12(J1, x) . . . ST12(Jq, x) } ⊆ tpk−m+1(ϕ(x),Mj , d) such that
∀ψ(x) ∈ tpk−m+1(ϕ(x),Mj , d)(ψ(x) |= ST12(J1, x) ∨ . . . ∨ ST12(Jq, x)).
But then we obtain that
b 6|=j ST12(✷(J1 ∨ . . . ∨ Jq), x).
In fact, d falsifies this boxed disjunction for (Mj , b). But, given that
{ST12(J1, x) . . . ST12(Jq, x) } ⊆ tpk−m+1(ϕ(x),Mj , d),
the standard translation of boxed disjunction under consideration must be in
tpk−m+2(ϕ(x),Mj , b). Note, further, that by (a¯m, a) A (b¯m, b) we have
tpk−m+2(ϕ(x),Mi, a) ⊆ tpk−m+2(ϕ(x),Mj , b),
thus:
tpk−m+2(ϕ(x),Mj , b) ⊆ tpk−m+2(ϕ(x),Mi, a),
and therefore this boxed disjunction must be false at (Mi, a) as well. But then take
any c ∈ Ui such that a R✷i c and c falsifies the disjunction under consideration. By
choice of {ST12(J1, x) . . . ST12(Jq, x) } it follows that
tpk−m+1(ϕ(x),Mj , d) ⊆ tpk−m+1(ϕ(x),Mi, c),
and thus
tpk−m+1(ϕ(x),Mi, c) ⊆ tpk−m+1(ϕ(x),Mj , d),
But then, again by the definition of A, and given the fact that m + 1 ≤ k, we must
also have (a¯m, a, c) A (b¯m, b, d), and so condition (p-box-1) holds.
Ad Key Lemma 3:
Replace the verification of condition (box-2) with the following verification of con-
dition (box-1):
Choose any i, j such that { i, j } = { 1, 2 }, any a ∈ Ui, b ∈ Uj such that a A b, that
is to say, tpx(Mi, a) ⊆ tpx(Mj , b) and choose any d ∈ Uj for which we have b R✷j d.
Consider tpx(Mj , d). If {ST12(J1, x) . . . ST12(Jq, x) } is a finite subset of this type,
then we have
b 6|=j ST12(✷(J1 ∨ . . . ∨ Jq), x).
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Since by contraposition of a A b we have that tpx(Mj , b) ⊆ tpx(Mi, a), we obtain that
a 6|=i ST12(✷(J1 ∨ . . . ∨ Jq), x).
This means that every finite subset of the type
{R✷(a, x) } ∪ {¬ψ(x) | ψ(x) ∈ tpx(Mj, d)}
is satisfiable at [Mi, a]. Therefore, by compactness of first-order logic, this set is con-
sistent with Th([Mi, a]) and, by ω-saturation of both M1 and M2, it must be satisfied
in [Mi, a] by some c ∈ Ui. So for any such c we will have a R✷i c and, moreover,
∀ψ ∈ tpx(Mj , d)(c 6|=i ψ(x)).
Thus we have that tpx(Mj , d) ⊆ tpx(Mi, c), and further, by contraposition, that
tpx(Mi, c) ⊆ tpx(Mj , d). Thus we get that c A d and condition (box-2) is verified.
4.2 Case i = 2, j = 1
The changes in three key lemmas in this case will look as follows:
Ad Key Lemma 1:
Revise the inductive step for the case I = ✸J as follows:
In this case we have
ϕ(x) = ∃y(R✸(x, y) ∧ ST21(J, y)).
Assume that:
a |=i ∃y(R✸(x, y) ∧ ST21(J, y)) (36)
(a¯m, a) A (b¯m, b) (37)
m+ r(ϕ(x)) ≤ l (38)
Moreover, it follows from definition of r that:
r(ϕ(x)) ≥ 1 (39)
r(ST (J, y)) ≤ r(ϕ(x)) − 1 (40)
Now, by (36) choose a c ∈ Ui such that
a R✸i c (41)
c |=i ST21(J, y) (42)
Since (38) and (39) clearly imply that m < l, it follows from (37) and (p-diam-1) that
one can choose a d ∈ Uj, such that:
b R✸j d (43)
(a¯m, a, c) A (b¯m, b, d) (44)
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So, we get that:
m+ 1 + r(ST21(J, y)) ≤ l (from (38) and (40)) (45)
d |=j ST21(J, y) (from (42), (44), (45) by IH) (46)
Finally, from (43) and (46) infer that:
b |=j ∃y(R✸(x, y) ∧ ST21(J, y)),
and we are done.
Ad Key Lemma 2:
Replace the verification of conditions (p-diam-2(1)) and (p-diam-2(2)) with the
following verification of condition (p-diam-1):
Take any (a¯m, a) A (b¯m, b) such that m < k and any c ∈ Ui such that a R✸i c. In
this case we will also have m + 1 ≤ k. Then consider tpk−m+1(ϕ(x),Mi, c). This set
is non-empty, since by our assumption we have k −m+ 1 ≥ 1. Therefore, as we have
r(ST21(⊥ → ⊥, x)) = 1, we will also have ST21(⊥ → ⊥, x) ∈ tpk−m+1(ϕ(x),Mi, c).
Then, according to Lemma 2, there exists a finite non-empty set of logical equiva-
lents for tpk−m+1(ϕ(x),Mi, c). Choosing this finite set, we in fact choose some finite
{ST21(I1, x) . . . ST21(Ip, x) } ⊆ tpk−m+1(ϕ(x),Mi, c) such that
∀ψ(x) ∈ tpk−m+1(ϕ(x),Mi, c)(ST21(I1, x) ∧ . . . ∧ ST21(Ip, x) |= ψ(x)).
But then we obtain that
a |=i ST21(✸(I1 ∧ . . . ∧ Ip), x).
In fact, c veriifies this modalized conjunction for (Mi, a). But, given that
{ST21(I1, x) . . . ST21(Ip, x) } ⊆ tpk−m+1(ϕ(x),Mi, c),
the standard translation of modalized conjunction under consideration must be in
tpk−m+2(ϕ(x),Mi, a). Note, further, that by (a¯m, a) A (b¯m, b) we have
tpk−m+2(ϕ(x),Mi, a) ⊆ tpk−m+2(ϕ(x),Mj , b),
and therefore this modalized conjunction must be true at (Mj , b) as well. But then
take any d ∈ Uj such that b R✸j d and d verifies the conjunction under consideration.
By choice of {ST21(I1, x) . . . ST21(Ip, x) } it follows that
tpk−m+1(ϕ(x),Mi, c) ⊆ tpk−m+1(ϕ(x),Mj , d),
But then, again by the definition of A, and given the fact that m + 1 ≤ k, we must
also have (a¯m, a, c) A (b¯m, b, d), and so condition (p-diam-1) holds.
Ad Key Lemma 3:
Replace the verification of conditions (diam-2(1)) and (diam-2(2)) with the following
verification of condition (diam-1):
Choose any i, j such that { i, j } = { 1, 2 }, any a ∈ Ui, b ∈ Uj such that a A b, that
is to say, tpx(Mi, a) ⊆ tpx(Mj , b) and choose any c ∈ Ui for which we have a R✸i c.
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Consider tpx(Mi, c). If {ST21(I1, x) . . . ST21(Ip, x) } is a finite subset of this type,
then we have
a |=i ST21(✸(I1 ∧ . . . ∧ Ip), x).
By tpx(Mi, a) ⊆ tpx(Mj, b), we obtain that
b |=j ST12(✸(I1 ∧ . . . ∧ Ip), x).
This means that every finite subset of the type
{R✸(b, x) } ∪ {ψ(x) | ψ(x) ∈ tpx(Mi, c)}
is satisfiable at [Mj , b]. Therefore, by compactness of first-order logic, this set is con-
sistent with Th([Mj, b]) and, by ω-saturation of both M1 and M2, it must be satisfied
in [Mj, b] by some d ∈ Uj. So for any such d we will have b R✸j d and, moreover,
∀ψ ∈ tpx(Mi, c)(d |=j ψ(x)).
Thus we have that tpx(Mi, c) ⊆ tpx(Mj , d). Thus we get that c A d and condition
(diam-1) is verified.
Another important revision of the proofs given in Section for the case i = 2, j = 1
is omission of every reference to relation B, since asimulations are now being defined
as single relations rather than ordered couples of relations.
Finally, in order to accommodate the proofs in Section to the case i = j = 1 one
just needs to combine the revisions given in the present sections in a straightforward
way.
5 Characterization modulo first-order definable classes
of models
Theorem 2 establishes a criterion for the equivalence of first-order formula to a standard
translation of intuitionistic formula on arbitrary first-order models. But one may have
a special interest in a proper subclass κ of the class of first-order models viewing the
models which are not in this subclass as irrelevant, non-intended etc. In this case one
may be interested in the criterion for equivalence of a given first-order formula to a
standard translation of an intuitionistic predicate formula over this particular subclass.
It turns out that if some parts of this subclass are first-order axiomatizable then only
a slight modification of our general criterion is necessary to solve this problem.
To tighten up on terminology, we introduce the following definitions:
Definition 13. Let κ be a class of models. Then:
1. κ(Θ) = {M ∈ κ |M is a Θ-model };
2. κ(Θ) is first-order axiomatizable iff there is a set Ax of Θ-sentences, such that
a Θ-model M is in κ iff M |= Ax;
3. A set Γ of Θ-formulas is κ-satisfiable iff Γ is satisfied in some model of κ;
4. A Θ-formula ϕ κ-follows from Γ (Γ |=κ ϕ) iff Γ ∪ {¬ϕ } is κ-unsatisfiable;
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5. Θ-formulas ϕ and ψ are κ-equivalent iff ϕ |=κ ψ and ψ |=κ ϕ.
It is clear that for any class κ, such that Ax first-order axiomatizes κ(Θ), any set
Γ of Θ-formulas and any Θ-formula ϕ, Γ is κ-satisfiable iff Γ ∪ Ax is satisfiable, and
Γ |=κ ϕ iff Γ ∪ Ax |= ϕ.
We say, further, that a formula ϕ(x) is κ-invariant with respect to (i, j)-modal
asimulations (where i, j ∈ {1, 2}) iff it is invariant with respect to the class of (i, j)-
modal asimulations connecting models in κ.
Now for the criterion of κ-equivalence to an (i, j)-standard translation of modal
intuitionistic formula:
Theorem 3. Let κ be a class of first-order models such that κ(Θ) is first-order ax-
iomatizable for all finite Θ, and let ϕ(x) be κ-invariant with respect to (i, j)-modal
asimulations. Then ϕ(x) is κ-equivalent to an (i, j)-standard translation of a modal
intuitionistic formula.
Proof. Let Ax be the set of first-order sentences that axiomatizes κ(Σϕ). We may
assume that ϕ(x) is κ(Σϕ)-satisfiable, otherwise ϕ(x) is κ-equivalent to STij(⊥, x)
and we are done. In what follows we will write icκ(ϕ(x)) for the set
{ψ(x) ∈ intx(Σϕ) | ϕ(x) |=
κ ψ(x)}
Our strategy will be to show that icκ(ϕ(x)) |=
κ ϕ(x). Once this is done we will
conclude that
Ax ∪ icκ(ϕ(x)) |= ϕ(x).
Then we apply compactness of first-order logic and obtain that ϕ(x) is equivalent to
a finite conjunction
∧
Ψ(x) of formulas from this set. But it follows then that ϕ(x) is
κ-equivalent to the conjunction of the set icκ(ϕ(x)) ∩ Ψ(x). In fact, by our choice of
icκ(ϕ(x)) we have
ϕ(x) |=κ
∧
(icκ(ϕ(x)) ∩Ψ(x)),
And by Ψ(x) ⊆ Ax ∪ icκ(ϕ(x)) we have
Ax ∪ (icκ(ϕ(x)) ∩Ψ(x)) |= ϕ(x)
and hence
icκ(ϕ(x)) ∩Ψ(x) |=
κ ϕ(x).
To show that icκ(ϕ(x)) |=
κ ϕ(x), take any Σϕ-model M1 and a ∈ U1 such that
M1 ∈ κ and a |=1 icκ(ϕ(x)). Then, of course, we will also have icκ(ϕ(x)) ⊆ tpx(M1, a).
Such a model exists, because ϕ(x) is κ(Σϕ)-satisfiable and icκ(ϕ(x)) will be κ-satisfied
in any Σϕ-model satisfying ϕ(x). Then we can also choose a Σϕ-model M2 and b ∈ U2
such that M2 ∈ κ, b |=2 ϕ(x), and tpx(M2, b) ⊆ tpx(M1, a).
For suppose otherwise. Then for any Σϕ-model M ∈ κ such that U ⊆ N and any
c ∈ U such that M, c |= ϕ(x) we can choose a modal intuitionistic formula I(M,c) such
that STij(I(M,c), x) is in tpx(M, c) but not at tpx(M1, a). Then consider the set
S = {ϕ(x) } ∪ {¬STij(I(M,c), x) |M ∈ κ,M, c |= ϕ(x) }
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Let {ϕ(x),¬STij(I1, x) . . . ,¬STij(Iq, x) } be a finite subset of this set. If this set is
κ-unsatisfiable, then we must have
ϕ(x) |=κ STij(I1, x) ∨ . . . ∨ STij(Iq , x),
but then we will also have
(STij(I1, x) ∨ . . . ∨ STij(Iq , x)) ∈ icκ(ϕ(x)) ⊆ tpx(M1, a),
and hence (STij(I1, x)∨ . . .∨STij(Iq, x)) will be true at (M1, a). But then at least one
of STij(I1, x) . . . , STij(Iq , x) must also be true at (M1, a), which contradicts the choice
of these formulas. Therefore, every finite subset of S is κ-satisfiable. But then every
finite subset of the set S ∪Ax is satisfiable as well. By compactness of first-order logic
S ∪ Ax is satisfiable, and, by Lo¨wenheim-Skolem property of first-order logic, there is
a Σϕ-model M
′ and g ∈ U ′ such that U ′ ⊆ N and (M ′, g) satisfies S ∪ Ax. But then
we must have M ′ ∈ κ, since M ′ is a Σϕ-model satisfying the set of axioms for κ(Σϕ).
For this model and for this element in it we will have both M ′, g |= STij(I(M ′,g), x)
by choice of I(M ′,g) and M
′, g 6|= STij(I(M ′,g), x) by the satisfaction of S, a contradic-
tion.
Therefore, for any given Σϕ-model M1 such that M1 ∈ κ and for any a ∈ U1
satisfying icκ(ϕ(x)) we can choose a Σϕ-model M2 and b ∈ U2 such that M2 ∈ κ,
b |=2 ϕ(x), and tpx(M2, b) ⊆ tpx(M1, a). Then, reasoning exactly as in the proof
of Theorem 8, we conclude that a |=1 ϕ(x). Therefore, ϕ(x) in fact κ-follows from
icκ(ϕ(x)).
Theorem 4. Let κ be a class of first-order models such that for all finite Θ class κ(Θ)
is first-order axiomatizable. Then a formula ϕ(x) is κ-invariant with respect to (i, j)-
modal asimulations iff it is κ-equivalent to an (i, j)-standard translation of a modal
intuitionistic formula.
Proof. From left to right our theorem follows from Theorem 3. In the other direction,
assume that ϕ(x) is κ-equivalent to STij(I, x) and assume that for some Θ such that
Σϕ ⊆ Θ, some Θ-models M1, M2, and some a ∈ U1 and b ∈ U2 such that M1,M2 ∈ κ,
A is a (i, j)-modal 〈(M1, a), (M2, b)〉-asimulation and a |=1 ϕ(x). Then, since STij(I, x)
is κ-equivalent to ϕ(x) and M1 is in κ, we also have a |=1 STij(I, x). By Theore 2 it
follows that b |=2 STij(I, x), but since ST (I, x) is κ-equivalent to ϕ(x) andM2 is in κ,
we also have b |=2 ϕ(x). Therefore, ϕ(x) is κ-invariant with respect to asimulations.
Theorems 3 and 4 imply that (i, j)-modal asimulations as criteria for equivalence
to a standard translation of a modal intuitionistic formula are easily scalable down to
any first-order definable class of models. As all the conditions on intended models for
intuitionistic modal logic, that were presented in the existing literature, seem to be
easily first-order definable, this means that the criterion for equivalence of a formula
in correspondence language to an (i, j)-standard translation of modal intuitionistic
formula over the class of intended models will be just invariance with respect to (i, j)-
modal asimulations between the intended models.
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6 Conclusion
In this paper we have defined and vindicated 4 different versions of modal asimula-
tions, capturing the 4 different fragments of classical first-order logic induced by the
corresponding systems of satisfaction clauses for modal intuitionistic logic. In doing
so, we were concentrating on different variants of Kripke semantics for intuitionistic
modalities, present in the existing literature.
However, it is easy to see, that our approach is but an instance of a quite general
algorithm that can be easily generalized to deal with a much wider class of extensions
of intuitionistic propositional logic. It is not clear at the moment, how far such a
generalization is able to reach; we only mention here one conjecture to give reader
a flavor of what can be expected in the way of future work along the research lines
presented above.
It is easy to see that all the intuitionistic modalities considered above are instances
of a general scheme: the effect of the modality on its only argument is always a su-
perposition of ‘guarded’ quantifiers, that is to say, quantifiers, restricted by a binary
relation which is a part of Kripke model for this modality. To be more precise, let
us call a generalized intuitionistic modality any modality µI whose induced standard
translation looks as follows:
ST (µI, x) = Qnyn(Rn(yn, yn−1 ⊙n Qn−1(. . . Q1y1(R1(y1, x)⊙1 ST (I, x)) . . .)),
where n ≥ 1, and for all i such that 1 ≤ i ≤ n we assume Qi ∈ {∀, ∃}. Further, ⊙i =→
if Qi = ∀ and ⊙i = ∧ if Qi = ∃.
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Then our conjecture is that to capture the extension of intuitionistic propositional
logic by modality µ, one generally needs to define asimulation as a tuple (A1, . . . , Akµ)
of binary relations, where kµ ≤ n is the number of quantifier alternations in ST (µI, x).
The set of conditions on basic asimulation will then have to be enlarged by kµ new
conditions r1, . . . , rkµ , each having one of the two following forms: either
a1 Ap b1 ∧
m∧
s=1
(ιj(Ss)(bs, bs+1))⇒ ∃a2 . . . am ∈ Ui(
m∧
s=1
(ιi(Ss)(as, as+1)) ∧ am Aq bm),
or
a1 Ap b1 ∧
m∧
s=1
(ιi(Ss)(as, as+1))⇒ ∃b2 . . . bm ∈ Uj(
m∧
s=1
(ιj(Ss)(bs, bs+1)) ∧ am Aq bm),
for all a1, . . . , am ∈ Ui and all b1, . . . , bm ∈ Uj . Here, i, j have the same meaning as in
Definition 2 and {S1, . . . , Sm} ⊆ {R1, . . . , Rn}. Moreover, we will ensure that in the
last condition rkµ we will have Ap = A1 and that the form of rkµ will be the former of
the above forms if Qn is ∀ and the latter if Qn is ∃.
More precisely, we define r1, . . . , rkµ by induction on n as follows.
If n = 1 and Q1 = ∀, we set:
r1 := (a1 A1 b1 ∧ ιj(R1)(b1, b2))⇒ ∃a2 ∈ Ui(ιi(R1)(a1, a2) ∧ a2 Aj b2)),
6The relations R1, . . . , Rn need not be all different.
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and if Q1 = ∃, we set
r1 := (a1 A1 b1 ∧ ιi(R1)(a1, a2))⇒ ∃b2 ∈ Uj(ιj(R1)(b1, b2) ∧ a2 Aj b2)).
Incidentally, the fact that these singleton sets of conditions are adequate already follows
from the above proofs concerning (✷1) and (✸1).
Assume, further, that n = s+ 1 for s ≥ 1.
As induction hypothesis, we suppose that the set of conditions r1, . . . , rk
µ−
for µ−,
where
ST (µ−I, x) = Qn−1(. . . Q1y1(R1(y1, x)⊙1 ST (I, x)) . . .))
is already defined.
To define r1, . . . , rkµ , we need to distinguish the following cases:
Case 1. Qn = Qn−1. Then kµ = kµ− and we do not need to introduce new
conditions. Instead, we transform condition rk
µ−
in the following way:
Case 1.1 If Qn = Qn−1 = ∀, then by induction hypothesis condition rk
µ−
has the
form:
a1 A1 b1 ∧
m∧
s=1
(ιj(Ss)(bs, bs+1))⇒ ∃a2 . . . am ∈ Ui(
m∧
s=1
(ιi(Ss)(as, as+1)) ∧ am Aq bm).
We then replace rk
µ−
by the following rule rkµ , where we assume a
′ ∈ Ui, b
′ ∈ Uj :
a′ A1 b
′ ∧ (ιj(Rn)(b
′, b1) ∧
m∧
s=1
(ιj(Ss)(bs, bs+1))⇒
⇒ ∃a1 . . . am ∈ Ui(ιi(Rn)(a
′, a1) ∧
m∧
s=1
(ιi(Ss)(as, as+1)) ∧ am Aq bm).
Case 1.2 If Qn = Qn−1 = ∃, then by induction hypothesis condition rk
µ−
has the
form:
a1 A1 b1 ∧
m∧
s=1
(ιi(Ss)(as, as+1))⇒ ∃b2 . . . bm ∈ Uj(
m∧
s=1
(ιj(Ss)(bs, bs+1)) ∧ am Aq bm).
We then replace rk
µ−
by the following rule rkµ , where we assume a
′ ∈ Ui, b
′ ∈ Uj :
a′ A1 b
′ ∧ (ιi(Rn)(a
′, a1) ∧
m∧
s=1
(ιi(Ss)(as, as+1))⇒
⇒ ∃b1 . . . bm ∈ Uj(ιj(Rn)(b
′, b1) ∧
m∧
s=1
(ιj(Ss)(as, as+1)) ∧ am Aq bm).
Case 2. Qn 6= Qn−1. Then kµ = kµ− + 1 and we need to increase the number of
conditions by one. We do this as follows:
Case 2.1 If Qn = ∀, Qn−1 = ∃, then by induction hypothesis condition rk
µ−
has
the form:
a1 A1 b1 ∧
m∧
s=1
(ιi(Ss)(as, as+1))⇒ ∃b2 . . . bm ∈ Uj(
m∧
s=1
(ιj(Ss)(bs, bs+1)) ∧ am Aq bm).
28 Grigory. K. Olkhovikov
we then replace rk
µ−
by the following condition r′k
µ−
:
a1 Akµ b1 ∧
m∧
s=1
(ιi(Ss)(as, as+1))⇒ ∃b2 . . . bm ∈ Uj(
m∧
s=1
(ιj(Ss)(bs, bs+1)) ∧ am Aq bm),
and we add the following new condition rkµ :
a1 A1 b1 ∧ ιj(Rn)(b1, b2))⇒ ∃a2 ∈ Ui(ιi(Rn)(a1, a2) ∧ a2 Akµ b2).
Case 2.2 If Qn = ∃, Qn−1 = ∀, then by induction hypothesis condition rk
µ−
has
the form:
a1 A1 b1 ∧
m∧
s=1
(ιi(Ss)(as, as+1))⇒ ∃b2 . . . bm ∈ Uj(
m∧
s=1
(ιj(Ss)(bs, bs+1)) ∧ am Aq bm),
we then replace rk
µ−
by the following condition r′k
µ−
:
a1 Akµ b1 ∧
m∧
s=1
(ιi(Ss)(as, as+1))⇒ ∃b2 . . . bm ∈ Uj(
m∧
s=1
(ιj(Ss)(bs, bs+1)) ∧ am Aq bm),
and we add the following new condition rkµ :
a1 A1 b1 ∧ ιj(Rn)(b1, b2))⇒ ∃a2 ∈ Ui(ιi(Rn)(a1, a2) ∧ a2 Akµ b2).
It is straightforward to verify that our systems of rules for both (✷2) and (✸2) were
generated according to the Cases 1.1 and 2.1 of this inductive definition, respectively.
Note, however, that this general scheme is not always the most effective one. For
example, consider an extension of intuitionistic propositional logic, where both (✸2)
and (✸1) are available. This would allow to considerably simplify the corresponding
notion of asimulation, indeed, one could get rid in this case of the second binary relation
B and define asimulations as appropriate type of single binary relation A.
The other thing worth noting is that the above mentioned scheme for defining
asimulations which capture expressive powers of generalized intuitionistic modalities is
neither the only nor the most abstract among the generalizations that naturally come
to mind in this respect.
Therefore, in our future work, we hope both to provide substantiation for the above-
defined scheme concerning the generalized intuitionistic modalities and further pursue
the manifold research opportunities opening along this research line.
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